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Abstract
Police agencies devote vast resources to minimising the time that it takes them to
attend the scene of a crime. Despite this, the long-standing consensus is that police
response time has no meaningful effect on the likelihood of catching offenders. We
revisit this question using a uniquely rich dataset from the Greater Manchester Po-
lice. To identify causal effects, we use a novel strategy that exploits discontinuities in
distance to the response station across locations next to each other, but on different
sides of division boundaries. Contrary to previous evidence, we find large and strongly
significant effects: in our preferred estimate, a 10% increase in response time leads
to a 4.7 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of clearing the crime. We find
stronger effects for thefts than for violent offenses, although the effects are large for
every type of crime. We find suggestive evidence in support of two mechanisms: the
likelihood of an immediate arrest and the likelihood that a suspect will be named by
a victim or witness both increase as response time becomes faster. We argue that,
under conservative assumptions, hiring an additional response officer would generate a
benefit, in terms of future crime prevented, equivalent to 170% of her payroll cost.
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1 Introduction
The likelihood that a crime is cleared and its offender charged is a central component of the
standard economic model of crime (Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973)1. It is also critical to the
incapacitation channel, by which societies can prevent hardened criminals from reoffending
(Shavell, 1987). Yet, the economics literature has barely devoted any attention to studying
the determinants of clearance rates in detail. While the institution with the responsibility
for clearing crimes, the police, has been the focus of much recent work, most such efforts
have been directed to studying its reduced form effect on crime. Typical approaches include
examining whether police numbers (Levitt, 1997), police composition (McCrary 2007, Miller
and Segal 2014) or high visibility patrolling (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004, Klick and
Tabarrok 2005, Evans and Owens 2007 and Draca et al. 2011) are associated with lower crime
rates. The implicit assumption is that a change in these variables can lead to higher chances
of catching offenders, which has an immediate deterrence effect as well as an incapacitation
effect over longer horizons. However, very little work has examined directly whether the
police can actually increase the clearance rate with either higher numbers or, especially,
with different operational practices.
A better understanding of the instruments used by police forces to apprehend criminals
would allow social scientists and policy makers to make sense of the differences in crime levels
and incarceration rates across jurisdictions and over time. The policy implications are also
important, given that, for instance, less than a quarter of crimes are cleared in the US.
Identifying which policies are most effective in increasing clearance rates could help improve
them without the need for additional police resources.
In this paper we study one of the most important instruments used by police forces
to apprehend criminals: responding rapidly when alerted to a crime. The effectiveness of
rapid response policing seems self-evident. By arriving more quickly, police officers should
be able to arrest any suspect and/or question any witness at the scene, as well as prevent
1We use the terminology of ’crime clearance’ to be consistent with the terminology in the US, where
most of related studies have taken place. In the UK, police forces use the term ’crime detection’. We define
’detection’ formally in Section 3. The overwhelming majority of cleared/detected crimes result in a criminal
charge.
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the destruction or contamination of physical evidence. Following this rationale, policing
textbooks often argue that the initial response is the most important part of any criminal
investigation (Hess and Hess 2012, College of Policing 2013). Rapid response has therefore
long been an integral part of the toolkit used by police forces to clear crimes (Bratton and
Knobler 2009, Karn 2013). In this spirit, police agencies devote vast resources to minimising
response times; they track and publicise response time statistics; and they often include
target response times as part of the core performance measures by which they are evaluated2.
The effectiveness of rapid response policing has, however, long been questioned by
criminologists. For instance, in his survey on the rise of evidence-based policing, Sherman
(2013) argues:
There is no direct evidence that rapid response can make any difference in detec-
tion or crime rates and some indirect evidence that it cannot. It is very rare that
rapid response can catch an offender.
Bayley (1996) is more specific:
Although many studies have sought to find it, there is no evidence that reducing
the time the police take to get to crime scenes increases the chances that criminals
will be caught (...). One qualification needs to be made: If police can arrive within
one minute of the commission of an offense, they are more likely to catch the
suspect. Any later and the chances of capture are very small, probably less than
one in ten.
The notion that rapid response has no meaningful effect on crime clearance rates is
one of the most well-established paradigms in the criminology literature3. Two complemen-
tary arguments are commonly put forward. Firstly, response time matters only within the
first minute after a crime takes place, an unrealistically short interval for even the most
2An illustration of the first point is that the response team comprises of 24% of the total number of
police officers in the Greater Manchester Police. On the second point, Appendix A displays a list of links
to response time statistics among major police agencies. To demonstrate the third point, the Boston Police
Department lists target average response within seven minutes for priority 1 calls as one of its three key
performance indicators. Response times are also an important part of other police departments’ performance
goals, including Houston, Phoenix, Austin and San Diego. For an assessment of widely-used measures of
police performance see Davis (2012).
3See, among others, Walker (1994), Frydl and Skogan (2004), Sullivan et al. (2004), Weisburd and Eck
(2004), Cordner and Scarborough (2010), Dempsey and Forst (2011), Katz and Walker (2012) and Siegel
and Worrall (2014).
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efficient police organisation (Bayley, 1996). Secondly, the delay before the police are noti-
fied is typically so long that the speed of any subsequent police action becomes irrelevant
(Sherman et al., 1997). The consensus among criminologists advocates a move away from
rapid response policing and into other activities, such as hot spot targeting (Braga, 2001)
and problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990), for which there seems to be substantial
evidence of effectiveness.
As we argue in detail below, existing evidence on the effect of police response time on
crime clearance is far from convincing. This is unsurprising, as public-use crime-level datasets
do not document police inputs, and therefore analysing response time requires the unlikely
collaboration of a police department. Additionally, there is the problem of endogeneity in
response time. Crimes assigned a higher priority could be those with an ex ante higher
or lower clearance difficulty. Furthermore, these crimes are likely to receive more police
investigative resources ex-post. As a result, identifying the causal effect of response time is
a challenging exercise.
This Study We estimate the effect of police response time on crime clearance using a
uniquely rich dataset and a novel research design that exploits discontinuities in response
times around the boundaries of police territorial divisions. Our dataset comprises of the
2008-2014 internal records of the Greater Manchester Police, which is the second largest
force in the United Kingdom and oversees a population of 2.6 million. Our dataset contains
information on crime characteristics, police inputs such as response time, and police outputs
such as whether the crime was cleared and, if so, how long that took. We first use OLS
regressions to document a negative semi-elasticity between response time and the clearance
rate.
To credibly identify causal effects, we first take advantage of a particular feature of
our police force: the fact that, when a call for service is received, the responding officer
often departs from the station where they are based, rather than from a random point along
a patrolling route. Therefore, crime scenes closer to a response station are reached more
quickly following a call for service.
Unobserved determinants of clearance difficulty at the area level might, however, cor-
relate with distance to the response station. To account for this, we exploit the partition
of the Greater Manchester territory into 11 operationally distinct divisions. This implies
that crime scenes within a small local area, but on different sides of a division boundary, are
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served by separate response stations, which may be at very different respective distances. In
our empirical specifications we control for the ’local area’ by introducing a large number of
geographical cell indicators, each representing an area of .185 squared kilometres (556 metres
by 332 metres). Variation in distance to the division response station, which we use as an
instrument for response time, is then largely due to crime scenes in the same geographical
cell falling on separate sides of division boundaries. Our identification strategy is in the
spirit of Black (1999) and Doyle et al. (2015), although to the best of our knowledge we are
the first to combine small geographical cells with political boundaries to take advantage of
discontinuities in a continuous explanatory variable of interest.
We perform three separate balancing tests to confirm the identification assumption
that the characteristics of a crime are uncorrelated with distance to the division response
station, conditional on the geographical cell indicators. We also take advantage of the fact
that some police stations do not have response teams to test the exclusion restriction that
distance to a police station affects the clearance rate exclusively through the response time
channel.
Findings The estimated effect of response time on the clearance rate is negative, large and
strongly significant. Our preferred estimate suggests that a 10% increase in response time
leads to a 4.7 percentage points decrease in the clearance rate. The 2SLS estimate is in fact
much larger than its OLS counterpart, which is consistent with distance affecting response
time especially for crimes for which the effect of response time on crime clearance is larger.
We also find an effect on the intensive margin: conditional on clearing a crime, the police
take less time to do so if the initial response time was faster. The effects are larger for thefts
than for violent crimes, although they are also large for the latter.
As discussed above, there are several potential mechanisms through which the police
could convert a faster response into a higher clearance rate. We first study whether arriving
at the crime scene relatively quickly allows the police to find witnesses to the crime, question
them before their recollections worsen and encourage their cooperation by signaling efficiency
and dedication. There is suggestive evidence that this is indeed the case: using our baseline
empirical strategy, we find that the likelihood of having a suspect named by a victim or
witness decreases with response time, especially for thefts. We also find that the effect of
response time on the clearance rate is larger for thefts than for violent crimes, which, as we
argue below, is consistent with the ’information on suspects’ mechanism being empirically
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important.
We then study whether response time affects the likelihood of making an arrest im-
mediately after reaching the crime scene. We find that this likelihood is decreasing with
response time, both for thefts and for violent crimes. We interpret this as suggestive evi-
dence that the ability to make an on-scene arrest is an important mechanism through which
faster response times increase the clearance rate.
In the last section of the paper, we carry out a cost-benefit analysis of two alternative
policies designed to reduce response times. We find that hiring an additional response officer
would decrease response times, such that the benefit to society in terms of the future crime
prevented is equivalent to 170% of her payroll cost. We also compute the maximum cost at
which the policy of moving police stations to locations closer to the average crime would be
cost-effective.
Related Work Our findings contradict long-held beliefs among criminologists and other
social scientists regarding the effectiveness of rapid response policing. This consensus emerged
as a result of the influential Kansas City Response Time Analysis Study (Pate et al. 1976,
Kelling 1977). The Kansas City study examined a limited set of crimes in two neighbour-
hoods and throughout four months, and found no correlation between police travel time (i.e.
the time between an officer being asked to attend a scene and arrival at the scene) and the
likelihood of an arrest. It was then concluded that the lack of a correlation was due to the
fact that it took too long for the police to be alerted (see also Spelman and Brown, 1981).
The Kansas City study suffered from significant shortcomings, including the limited
and highly non-random sample; the fact that only one component of total response time (i.e.
travel time) was evaluated; the fact that even this component was measured with substantial
measurement error; the fact that only on-scene arrests were measured, while ignoring arrests
later in time; and perhaps most importantly, the lack of any attempt to identify causal effects.
In addition to the deficiencies above, the relevance of the Kansas City study for modern times
is limited by the vast organisational, technological and societal changes that have occurred
in the last 40 years. These shortcomings have long been acknowledged. Despite this, the
matter is regarded as settled, with no study in four decades revisiting the issue. Sherman
et al. (1997), for instance, argue that ’the evidence is strong ’ and that, while it is non-
experimental, ’there is neither empirical nor theoretical justification for such an expensive
(experimental) test ’. The fact that police agencies devote vast resources to minimising
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response times is regarded by criminologists as counter to evidence-based best practices.
Our paper is also related to an emerging literature in economics studying the efficiency
of the police in clearing crimes. Garicano and Heaton (2010), Soares and Viveiros (2010)
and Mastrobuoni (2014) all study whether the adoption of information technology by police
agencies allows them to be more productive in this respect. Adda et al. (2014) show that the
depenalisation of cannabis possession in a London borough allowed the police to reallocate
effort and clear more non-drug related crimes.
While no study in economics has examined the relation between response time and
the clearance rate, Mastrobuoni (2015) studies a related question: whether clearance rates
of commercial robberies in Milan are lower around the time during which police patrols
change shifts4. He finds that the clearance rate around these shift changes is 30% lower, and
calculates that this is likely to lead to a decrease in crime through the incapacitation channel.
While Mastrobuoni (2015) does not observe response time directly, a natural interpretation
of his findings is that clearance rates around shift changes are lower because the police takes
longer to reach the crime scene at these times.
Lastly, Weisburd (2016) uses the response of patrolling officers to incident calls outside
their beat area as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the effect of police presence on
crime deterrence. She shows that minimising response times has a clear cost: by deserting
their beats, patrolling officers are leaving them vulnerable to opportunistic crime. Our paper
complements her findings in emphasising instead the benefits of rapid response policing.
Plan We describe the institutional setting in Section 2. We introduce the data in Section
3. We describe the empirical strategy in Section 4. We present the main results of the paper
in Section 5. In Section 6, we explore the potential mechanisms for these main results. In
Section 7 we carry out a cost-benefit analysis of two policies designed to reduce response
times. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting
In this section, we outline some of the key features of the institutional setting in which our
study takes place.
4An institutional peculiarity of the Milanese police is that these shift changes are likely to be particularly
disruptive at regular and exogenous intervals, which allows the estimation of the causal effects of such shift
changes.
7
Organisational Structure The Greater Manchester Police (henceforth GMP) employs
approximately 6,200 officers to serve a metropolitan area with a population of 2.6 million
people. Many important units such as those engaged in the investigation of organised crime
are situated in the GMP central headquarters, in North Manchester. The neighbourhood
patrolling and the incident response functions, however, fall under the responsibility of the 11
territorial divisions. Figure 1 displays the geographical areas served by each of the divisions.
The division boundaries coincide with municipal boundaries (municipalities are called ’local
authorities’ or ’boroughs’ in the United Kingdom) other than for the city of Manchester,
which is divided into North Manchester and South Manchester5.
Each division has its own headquarters and a number of additional police stations
from which the neighbourhood and (sometimes) the response teams operate. While the
organisational structures often differ across divisions, the response and the neighbourhood
teams are always operationally and hierarchically separated. Figure 2 provides a simplified
version of a typical division organisational chart. The two teams are supervised by their
respective chief inspectors, who in turn report to different superintendents. The lines of
authority only merge at the highest level, in the figure of the chief superintendent. A
consequence of this operational independence is that, when an incident call requiring either
Immediate (Grade 1) or Priority (Grade 2) is received, an officer in the response team will
typically be assigned to it even if a neighbourhood officer happens to be patrolling a nearby
location6.
Call Handlers and Grade Allocation Every 999 call transferred to the GMP must be
answered within a very short time by a specialised staff member, i.e. a call handler. The
call handling team operates from a single central location in Manchester. Call handlers are
not geographically specialised, i.e. every handler indistinctly receives calls from every area
of Manchester. In answering a call, the handler questions the victim or witness, provides
5Our empirical strategy in Section 4 will separately identify local authority/division effects from the effect
of response time.
6This is regarded as an efficient way to operate, for three reasons. Firstly, asking a neighbourhood
officer to respond would obviously distract her from her main responsibility, i.e. patrolling. Secondly,
neighbourhood officers operate mostly on foot, so it would often take longer for them to arrive at an incident
scene, even if they start from a closer location. Thirdly, response officers have an array of legal powers
and specialised training that other officers lack. For instance, neighbourhood officers are often PCSOs (i.e.
Police Community Support Officers) without the power to arrest. Furthermore, neighbourhood officers are
typically not armed with guns or tasers, while response officers often are. For Grade 1 and Grade 2 incidents
a response officer will be assigned even if a patrol officer is ’right outside the house’.
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advice and support if necessary, records the information received in the internal system, and
assigns an opening code and a grade level.
The GMP Graded Response Policy divides calls into two categories that require the
allocation of a response officer. Calls allocated a grade level 1 (Emergency Response) require
the attendance of a response officer within 15 minutes of their receipt. The corresponding
target for grade level 2 (Priority Response) is 60 minutes.
The allocation of a grade level to an incident call is done by taking into account two
main factors: (a) whether there is a danger to someone’s safety or for serious damage to
property, and (b) whether evidence or witnesses are likely to be lost if attendance is delayed.
The decision rule that call handlers follow in practice is relatively complex, as it involves
a combination of written guidelines, unwritten but generally followed practices and their
own experience. The GMP Graded Response Policy prescribes that a grade level 1 should
typically be assigned when there is an imminent threat of violence or a crime in operation,
while a grade level 2 is appropriate when there is no imminent threat but there may be a
genuine concern for someone’s safety. Calls where it is appreciated that witness or evidence
is likely to be lost if attendance is delayed beyond one hour should also be allocated a Grade
2. Calls that require the attendance of an officer but where there is no threat to safety or
potential loss of evidence are allocated a Grade 3 by the call handlers7.
Radio Operators Once the call handler has provided her input the incident becomes the
responsibility of a radio operator. The radio operations team is also located centrally, but
separately from the call handling team. Radio operators are geographically specialised, so
when a call is received it will be the operator in charge of that area of Manchester who will
be assigned to it. The radio operator uses the call handler’s information, her own judgment
and officer availability to assign response officers to incidents. Coordination between the
radio operator in charge of a division and the local response officers is mostly direct, i.e.
without involving the shift sergeant. Officers are in constant communication with the radio
7We will not use Grade 3 calls in our empirical analysis. The reason is that the allocation of officers to
Grade 3 calls is less straightforward than the one for Grade 1 and Grade 2 calls, in ways that can potentially
violate the exclusion restriction of our empirical strategy in Section 4. In particular, Grade 3 calls are often
(but not always) attended by neighbourhood officers, such as PCSOs. Firstly, PCSOs may be less likely to
contribute to the clearance of a case, given their limited training and legal powers. Secondly, since they are
typically patrolling their local beats and therefore not based in the response stations, they may be more
likely to be sent to calls located far away from these stations. These two issues suggest caution in using
Grade 3 calls in a setting where distance to the response station is being used as an instrument for response
time.
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operators and inform them when they have reached the incident scene. The time elapsed
between the call handler’s creation of the incident and the officer arrival to the scene is the
response time whose effect we will be estimating.
Response Stations Response officers could in principle spend their shifts moving from
one incident scene to another, without ever setting foot in the station where their team is
officially based. For two reasons officers are, however, often present in the station when
they are asked to respond to a call. Firstly, they may have finished dealing with an incident
and, in the absence of a new call for service, reported back to the station. The second
and more important reason is that, to be processed, most incidents require the inputting of
information into the internal systems, which are office-based. While we do not observe in our
dataset where response officers travel from on an incident-by-incident basis, we will confirm
empirically that the geodesic distance between an incident scene and the closest response
station (in the division to which the incident scene belongs) represents a very strong predictor
of response time.
Some divisions changed the location of their response stations during our sample period.
These changes led to mechanical variation in distance to the response station within a local
area and across time. Needless to say, the relocation of the stations may be correlated with
the evolution of crime patterns in Manchester. For example, the headquarters of the North
Division relocated in 2011 to a newly developed business park, as part of an expensive urban
regeneration project that included the creation of a new tram link. It is conceivable, in
this example and in others, that the clearance difficulty of local crimes could have changed
contemporaneously with the response station relocation. Therefore, we will be careful in
Section 4 to isolate the cross-sectional variation in distance to the response station (on which
our empirical strategy is based) from the potentially endogenous time variation caused by
station relocations.
Response Time and the Technology of Clearing a Crime Upon arrival, response
officers interrogate the victim and/or caller, question potential witnesses, undertake a pre-
liminary investigation and report back to the radio operators. They then need to produce
a report documenting the information gathered up to that point. The crime then typically
becomes the responsibility of a neighbourhood officer (for less serious crimes such as thefts
or assaults) or a dedicated detective (for more serious crimes such as sexual assaults or homi-
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cides). The importance of the crime will obviously also determine the amount of resources
that the GMP devotes to its investigation.
There are several mechanisms through which faster response time could translate into
a higher clearing rate. If the crime is still ongoing, the officers could obviously apprehend the
offender before he manages to flee. Even if the criminal has left the scene, a faster response
may help coordinate the search for him before he has managed to get too far8. Secondly, the
evidence could be improved when it is gathered more quickly. Physical evidence deteriorates
over time, especially when located outdoors, so collecting it earlier will potentially improve
its quality. Perhaps more importantly, when arriving more promptly, responding officers may
be more likely to find witnesses to the crime and to interrogate them before their recollections
worsen. A faster response also provides a strong signal to the victim and witnesses that the
police is both competent and likely to take the offense seriously, which could improve their
willingness to cooperate in the investigation.
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our dataset contains every Grade 1 and Grade 2 999 call alerting the police to an ongoing
or past crime in the period between April 2008 and August 20149. For every call we observe
among other things the location of the incident, the police response time, the UK Home
Office crime classification code and an indicator of whether the crime was cleared10,11.
We obtained from the GMP the locations of the police stations where the response
8A senior leader associated with a different police organisation confided to us that street robberies and
assaults are much more likely to result in an arrest if the responding officers do a ’drive-around’. A ’drive-
around’ consists of obtaining the description of the assailant and circling the vicinity of the crime scene in
a police car looking for individuals matching the description.
9Our baseline sample contains only crimes reported to the police through a 999 call. In Appendix Table
A8, we expand the sample to include also crimes reported through the police radio, presumably because they
were discovered by the police themselves. We impute response time to being zero for these radio-reported
crimes. We find in Appendix Table A8 that the baseline estimates of the paper (in Table 4 Panel B) are
very similar when we expand the sample to include these radio-reported crimes.
10Although we refer to ’crime clearance’, the corresponding terminology in the UK is ’crime detection’.
The official definition of ’detection’ is as follows: ’A sanctioned detection occurs when (1) a notifiable offence
(crime) has been committed and recorded; (2) a suspect has been identified and is aware of the detection;
(3) the Crime Prosecution Service evidential test is satisfied; (4) the victim has been informed that the
offence has been detected, and; (5) the suspect has been charged, reported for summons, or cautioned, been
issued with a penalty notice for disorder or the offence has been taken into consideration when an offender is
sentenced.’ See http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/percentage-detected-and-sanctioned-offences-borough.
11We use the final classification code, which is assigned following the police investigation. Incidents are
also given an initial (’opening’) code by the handler taking the call. In case of multiple crimes occurring at
the same time, an incident is given the code corresponding to the most serious one. This is known as the
’Principal Crime Rule’ (Home Office, 2016).
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teams were based during our sample period, for each of the 11 divisions. Each of these
police stations was also the base of a neighbourhood team, in charge of patrolling a set of
local areas. In addition, we were able to identify the location of other police stations that
were the base of a neighbourhood team but not of a response team. We use the location
of these neighbourhood non-response stations to test the exclusion restriction of our 2SLS
strategy below.
Summary Statistics Table 1 Panel A provides basic summary statistics for the main
variables in our study. Note first that our sample size is large, as it includes more than
300,000 crimes. Around 38% of these crimes were cleared, although this percentage varies
considerably by Home Office classification code or by grade level. We can also see that
the response time distribution is highly skewed, with a mean of more than one hour and a
median of just 17 minutes. This skewness is confirmed in Figure 3 Panel A, where we can
see that the density of the response time distribution peaks at around 5 minutes and falls
concavely after that.
Around 31% of calls are allocated a Grade 1 priority level. Theft offences represent
around half of all crimes (53%), and violent offences approximately a quarter (24%).
OLS Estimates Figure 4 Panel A displays a kernel regression of the clearance rate on
response time12. In addition to suggesting a negative relation, note that the shape of the
relation appears strongly concave. This seems unsurprising, as every extra minute should
make a bigger difference when response time is relatively fast. We will therefore use the
log specification in our main regressions below, although Table 5 Panel A shows that the
baseline estimates are qualitatively unchanged when measuring response time in levels.
Table 2 displays linear probability models of the crimes being cleared on (the log of)
response time, accounting for an increasingly richer set of controls. Our most exhaustive
specification in Column 5 controls for the hour of day, day of week, month and year in which
the call was received, the division where the crime occurred, the grade level assigned by the
call handler, and the Home Office-classified crime type. We find that faster response times
are associated with a higher likelihood of a clearance. The estimated effect indicates that a
12The clearance rate variable is time-censored, since the likelihood of solving a crime increases with time.
However, the overwhelming majority of crimes are cleared quite quickly, which makes this issue likely neg-
ligible in our setting. To illustrate this, 58% of clearances occur within the first week, 78% within the first
month, and 96% within the first six months. We have therefore decided to ignore this potential problem in
our regressions. We obtain very similar findings if we drop the last six months of 2014 from our dataset.
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10 percent decrease in response time is associated with a .49 percentage points increase in
the clearance rate13.
For several reasons we need to be cautious in giving the OLS estimates a causal in-
terpretation. Firstly, note that the information recorded by the handler during the call will
determine the priority it receives, and likely be correlated both with unobserved character-
istics of the crime and with the difficulty of clearing it. Secondly, response time may be
directly affected by the estimated likelihood of clearing the crime, in ways that are difficult
to pin down. For instance, response time may be particularly slow when a burglar is re-
ported to have left the scene long ago (low likelihood of clearing the crime), but also when
a shoplifter has been detained by a security guard (high likelihood), since in both cases the
marginal effect of a faster response may be evaluated to be low. Lastly, response time may
be correlated with other policing inputs, such as the ability and attention of the responding
officer. On the one hand, officers who are less competent in other dimensions of the investi-
gation may take longer to arrive at the scene. Alternatively, it may be those officers who are
aware of their low ability in other dimensions that put more effort into responding quickly.
It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the causal relation between response time and
the clearance rate without a credible source of exogenous variation in the former.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this section we explain in some detail the construction of our instrument for response
time. We first describe our measure of distance, discuss its potential as an instrument and
explore its empirical variation. We then explain why, after controlling for a large number of
small geographical cells, distance to the division response station could be regarded as a valid
instrument for response time. We also discuss potential threats to the exclusion restriction.
13Contrary to the finding of the Kansas City Response Time Analysis Study, our OLS estimates are
negative and highly statistically significant. To understand the reasons for this difference, we evaluate in
Appendix Table A1 the sensitivity of our estimate to conditions closer to those of that study. In particular,
(a) we discretise the measurement of response time into the three categories used there, (b) we use immediate
arrests as the dependent variable, and (c) we randomly select a subsample of the same size as the Kansas
City Response Time Analysis study. Our response time measure is, however, still computed with close
to no measurement error, as we found no obvious way to introduce measurement error to account for the
witness recollections on which the Kansas City measure is based. Separately, none of the adjustments that
we perform completely eliminates the statistical significance of our estimate. Together, however, they do.
The zero estimate from the Kansas City study is therefore likely the result of using data that is suboptimal
on more than one dimension, including possibly the witness-recollection measurement of response time that
we were unable to convincingly replicate.
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In the latter part of this section, we perform tests of exogeneity of our instrument and
interpret the corresponding results.
Distance and its Variation As we mentioned in Section 2, a call for service from a
Greater Manchester location needs to be responded by the division response team, i.e. the
team in the GMP division to which that location belongs. Our measure of distance is the
geodesic, or ’as the crow flies’, distance between the latitude and longitude of the crime scene
and the latitude and longitude of the closest division response station. Table 1 shows that
this measure is skewed to the right, with a mean of 3.2 km. and a much lower median of 2.3
km. We find in Figure 4 Panel B that the relation between response time and distance is
strongly positive and approximately linear. This finding provides a validation of our claim in
Section 2 that response officers often depart from the division response station when called
to attend an incident. In Panel C we display a kernel regression between the clearance rate
and distance. We interpret this relation as a ’naive reduced form’, given our finding below
that distance is not orthogonal to crime characteristics that are correlated with the clearance
rate. Like the relation between the clearance rate and response time, we find it to be negative
and concave.
Distance has been used as a source of exogenous variation by Reinikka and Svensson
(2005), Dittmar (2011), Dube et al. (2013) and Campante et al. (2014), among others. Its
validity as an instrument will obviously depend on the specific setting that is being studied.
In our setting caution is warranted, since crimes in different areas may differ in terms of their
clearance difficulty. This could be by chance. For instance, it may be that response stations
tend to be located in city centres, and that crimes in these areas are easier or more difficult
to clear than crimes in suburban areas. The correlation between distance to the response
station and clearance difficulty could also be by design. In particular, it may be that police
agencies choose to locate their response stations in high-crime, and perhaps high-difficulty-
crime, areas, so that they can minimise response time for crimes in these areas.
Intuition of the Instrument Locations that neighbour each other but are on different
sides of division boundaries are the responsibility of different response teams departing from
stations that will typically be located at different respective distances14. Our instrument is
14To investigate compliance with this rule, we merged the location of all the crimes in our dataset with
GMP-supplied shape files detailing the division boundaries. We then compared the division of the team that
responded to a call with the division that, according to our shape files, should have officially responded.
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based on the notion that, if we control with sufficient precision for the ’local area’ where
a crime occurs, the remaining variation in distance is mostly due to crime locations falling
on different sides of division boundaries and can therefore provide a source of exogenous
variation in response time.
In Figure 5, we clarify this intuition by displaying two geographical cells crossing the
boundary of two divisions. As we can see, the marked hypothetical locations in Cell 3 differ
significantly in the distance to their respective stations. And yet, these locations are next to
each other, and crimes occurring in them should have the same average clearance difficulty.
The grid that we select for our baseline specifications covers the entire Greater Manch-
ester Area and it contains 5,152 unique cells of .005 by .005 decimal degrees (approximately
.185 squared kilometres or 556 metres by 332 metres)15. On average, around 504 people
reside in each cell. For comparison, US census block groups have an average of 1,400 inhab-
itants. Figure 5 superimposes three realistically-sized cells on the map of Manchester and
illustrates that only a handful of streets fit into a cell16.
Accounting for Division Effects One reason that the two marked locations in Figure
5 differ is, of course, that they belong to different divisions. This fact may be of concern,
for two reasons. Firstly, it may be that response teams in some divisions are simply better
than others at clearing crimes, and that this is correlated with the average distance to the
We found that they coincide in 99.31% of the crimes in our dataset, indicating that the official assignment
rule is followed in the vast majority of cases. The remaining .69% of cases could have been associated with
deviations from the official rule or, alternatively, may have been affected by measurement error in either the
location variables or the division variable.
15At the latitude of Greater Manchester, a movement of .005 decimal degrees towards the equator repre-
sents a higher number of metres than an equivalent movement in the direction of the Greenwich meridian,
hence the rectangular shape of our cells. We chose the number of cells with the following procedure. We
first constructed a grid consisting of cells of .0005 squared degrees. We then tested whether, controlling for
these cell indicators, distance was still a strong predictor of response time. If the answer was yes, we divided
the cells into 22 sub-cells, and estimated our first stage regression with the new set of cell indicators. We
continued until reaching the highest possible number of cells, consistently with a strong first stage that could
be used to vary response time significantly. Our findings are robust to using a smaller or larger number of
cells, although the strength of the instrument obviously decreases if we increase the number of cells beyond
5,152.
16In Table 1 Panel B, we replicate the summary statistics for the subsample of crimes occurring in the
’boundary cells’ that encompass more than one division. As one would expect, crimes occurring close to
the boundary of divisions are on average further away from the response station. They also have higher
than average response times and a lower clearance rate. The characteristics in terms of grade and crime
type are similar to those in the main sample. In Figures A3 and A4 of the Appendix, we replicate for this
subsample the kernel density plots and kernel regressions of Figures 3 and 4. We draw approximately similar
conclusions, with the exception of the relation between the clearance rate and distance, which appears to be
much noisier. This is unsurprising, given the much reduced sample size and the fact that we are comparing
crimes across (as well as within) cells, even if the cells all happen to be boundary cells.
15
station across divisions. For example, the response team of the (small) North Division may be
differently effective at clearing crimes than its counterpart in the (large) Wigan Division (see
Figure 1). Secondly, division boundaries often coincide with municipal (or, as they are called
in the United Kingdom, ’local authority’) boundaries. As a result, crossing a boundary could
have an independent effect on the difficulty of clearing crimes if, for instance, the populations
in different local authorities are affected by different types of crimes. For these two reasons,
we need to ensure that any estimated effect of response time does not include the ’division
effects’ resulting from divisions (of potentially different size) having different types of crime
or levels of policing efficiency.
Figure 5 illustrates that these division effects can be separately identified from the
response time effect. For instance, because the two marked Division F locations from Cells
2 and 3 vary in the distance to their response station, the addition of geographical cell
indicators and division indicators does not exhaust all the sample variation in distance. Our
empirical specifications will therefore always introduce a full set of division indicators.
Estimating Equations We use a 2SLS approach to estimate the effect of response time
on the clearance rate. The first stage equation between (the log of) response time and (the
log of) distance for crime i occurring in year t(i) in a location belonging to cell j(i) and
division d(i) is:
Responsei = α0 + α1Distancei + Cellj(i) × Y eart(i) +Divisiond(i) + Xi + i (1)
where Xi is a vector of controls such as hour of day, day of week, month, grade level and
Home Office classification code indicators.
Note that the cell indicators are interacted with a set of year indicators. The reason
for this is as follows. Remember from Section 2 that the location of the response stations
changed across our sample period for some GMP divisions. These changes create time
variation in distance to the division station for a fixed location, even after controlling for
the cell indicators. For the reasons discussed in Section 2 this time variation is potentially
correlated with changes in crime patterns. We can, however, separate this time variation
from our preferred cross-sectional variation based on division boundaries by interacting the
cell indicators with a set of year indicators. After doing that, any variation in distance is
mostly due to crimes in the same cell/year falling on different sides of division boundaries
and therefore at different distances of their (fixed within a cell/year) response stations.
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The second stage equation is:
Clearedi = β0 + β1 ˆResponsei + Cellj(i) × Y eart(i) +Divisiond(i) + Xi + υi (2)
where Clearedi is a dummy variable that takes value one if the crime was cleared and
ˆResponsei captures the fitted values from (1).
In Appendix B we compare our empirical strategy with the strategies in studies such as
Black (1999) and Doyle et al. (2015) that use boundary discontinuities for identification. In
particular, we comment on the differences in approach and explain why our current strategy
is well suited to the question and institutional setting of this paper.
Threats to Identification This empirical approach is subject to six main concerns. The
first is the possibility that the geographical cells may not be small enough, in which case the
assumption of homogeneity of locations within a cell will not be satisfied.
The second potential concern is the possibility of household sorting. For example,
households concerned about crime may decide to locate themselves on the side of the di-
vision boundary with the lowest police response times, in the same way that educationally
committed families have been shown to congregate in the catchment areas of good schools
(Black 1999, Bayer et al. 2007).
The third concern is due to potential sorting by criminals. If sophisticated criminals
target locations on the higher-distance side of a border, these locations will be associated with
more crimes, and with crimes that are more difficult to solve, posing a threat to identification.
The fourth concern is more subtle, and it has to do with the mechanical effect that
response time and the associated likelihood of arrest and imprisonment have on the com-
position of the criminal population. Namely, it may be that lower-distance locations are
depleted of some of their local criminals over time, and that the remaining criminals commit
crimes of higher or lower clearance difficulty17.
The fifth concern is that a lower response time may affect not only the likelihood of a
clearance but also the nature of the crime itself. For instance, an immediate response may
17This is probably not a big concern, for two reasons. Firstly, it relies on criminals being extremely
consistent in their location decisions, for instance by always committing their crimes at home. If instead
they cross division boundaries with a positive likelihood, the differential effect on the composition of the
local criminal populations on opposite sides of the boundaries will be milder. Secondly, the United Kingdom
has relatively low incarceration rates, at least by U.S. standards. Differential incapacitation of criminals
(and their associated effects on the composition of the local criminal populations) are therefore likely to be
small.
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prevent an attempted murder from becoming a murder or an assault from turning into an
aggravated assault. If different crime classifications require different standards for clearance,
a faster response time may be affecting the clearance rate indirectly (through its effect on
the type of crime itself) as well as directly.
The last concern relates to the exclusion restriction integral to any 2SLS framework.
To adequately identify the effect of response time on the clearance rate, distance to the
response station must affect the clearance rate exclusively through the response time channel.
The concern arises because police stations that accommodate response teams typically also
contain the teams in charge of neighbourhood patrolling, and it is conceivable that crimes
in areas closer to a neighbourhood station may be more likely to be cleared. For instance,
these areas may on average be patrolled more intensely. Alternatively, it may be that,
following spikes in crime, patrolling increases more in areas that are closer to a patrolling
station, perhaps because it is easier for the leadership of the neighbourhood teams to notice
increases in crime when these occur close to their base18. Lastly and most importantly, police
patrols may be more likely to stop at a crime scene to hear additional witnesses and gather
additional evidence if that scene is closer to the station from which they operate. This is
particularly important because neighbourhood officers are in charge of following up on the
investigation of the majority of crimes committed in Manchester.
In the remainder of this section, we undertake three separate balancing tests to evaluate
the empirical relevance of the first five concerns outlined above. In Section 5, we exploit the
fact that some patrolling stations are not response stations to examine the validity of the
exclusion restriction. To do this, we examine whether distance to patrolling stations (that
are neighbourhood non-response stations) is associated with a higher clearance rate.
Balancing Test 1: Household Demographics Our first test examines the first two
concerns outlined above. In particular, we want to examine empirically whether, controlling
for the cell and division indicators that are at the core of our empirical strategy, there is
any evidence that households located at different distances of their respective stations differ
in their demographic characteristics. To do this, we create a dataset of the 8,683 Greater
Manchester output areas, the smallest geographical areas in the 2011 UK census. Using the
latitude and longitude of every output area geographical centre, we assign it to a division,
18There is evidence that criminals who are not immediately arrested tend to reoffend within a few days in
the same area (Mastrobuoni, 2015). Heavier patrolling following a local spike in crime might then be more
likely to apprehend these repeat offenders.
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and compute the distance to the 2014 closest response station. We also assign each output
area to a geographical cell. We then regress distance on a set of demographic characteristics,
controlling for the cell and division indicators. The estimated coefficients and confidence
intervals can be found in Figure 6.
To illustrate the value of our empirical strategy, we also display the equivalent esti-
mates and confidence intervals in a regression omitting the baseline set of cell and division
indicators. We find in Figure 6 that several demographic variables appear to be statistically
significant predictors of distance to the respective station at the output area level, when
cell and division controls are not included in the regression. For example, households living
further away from response stations are older, more likely to have children, and less likely to
have no qualifications. Controlling for cell and division indicators has two effects. Firstly, it
dramatically reduces the residual variance in the dependent variable (the adjusted R-squared
jumps from .06 to .98), leading to much lower standard errors. Secondly, we observe that the
estimated coefficients are now indistinguishable from zero (the F-statistic of joint significance
of the demographic variables decreases from 20.4 to 1.3).
We interpret the evidence in Figure 6 as indicating that output areas within the same
geographical cell contain households of similar demographic characteristics. This implies
that the geographical cells that we use are sufficiently small to ensure that locations within
each cell are identical in their observables, and therefore most likely in their unobservables.
It also indicates that the possibility of household sorting across division borders is unlikely.
Balancing Test 2: Total Number of Crimes Our second test evaluates jointly the
empirical relevance of the first five threats to identification. Every one of these hypotheses
predicts that the level of crime will be correlated with distance to the response station, even
after controlling for the cell and division indicators. To illustrate, consider the possibility
of sorting by criminals. If some criminals are sophisticated and target locations with slow
response time (including the high-distance side of division boundaries), then we should ob-
serve that locations further away from the station have more crime, both across and within
geographical cells.
To study whether this is an empirically relevant issue, we create a panel dataset of
census output areas and years, and compute the total number of crimes in each output
area and year combination. Again, we assign each output area/year to a division and to a
geographical cell. We then calculate the distance between the centre of each area and the
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closest response station in that year. In Table 3, we regress one on the other, with and
without controlling for the cell/year and division indicators.
Column 1 shows that areas further away from the response station are associated with
less crime (the elasticity is -7.5% and strongly significant). Interestingly, this finding is
inconsistent with the notion that criminals target areas with slower response time. The idea
that criminals are sophisticated in their location decisions seems therefore to be contradicted
by the evidence. On the other hand, a negative elasticity is consistent with the notion that
the GMP choose to locate their response stations in high-crime areas19.
Importantly for the purposes of evaluating the validity of our empirical strategy, note
that the estimated elasticity decreases dramatically and becomes statistically insignificant
after we control for the cell/year and division indicators. We interpret the evidence in
Table 3 as indicating that the first five threats to identification discussed above do not seem
empirically relevant.
Balancing Test 3: Crime Characteristics All the first five threats to identification
predict that, conditional on a crime occurring, the type of crime should be correlated with
distance to the response station, even after controlling for the cell indicators. For instance, if
sorting by criminals is an empirically relevant issue, we would expect it to be more prevalent
among property crimes such as thefts than among violent crimes. This is because thieves
are generally more sophisticated than violent criminals. Therefore, sorting by criminals
predicts that crimes occurring further away from the response station should include a higher
proportion of thefts, relative to violent offences.
To examine whether this is the case, we estimate the following empirical model on our
baseline dataset:
Distancei = pi0 + Cellj(i) × Y eart(i) +Divisiond(i) + Xi + i (3)
where Xi is our vector of interest, as it includes crime characteristics such as the UK Home
Office crime classification code and the grade level which are strongly correlated with the
clearance rate.
19An important difference between criminals and police agencies is that the latter have much better
information on which to base their decisions. For instance, they observe the locations of the response stations
and can experiment with them. They also have access to a large set of experience and hard data regarding
the relation between response time, distance and the clearance rate. Not even the most diligent criminals
can match that level of knowledge. We would therefore expect police agencies to be more sophisticated than
criminals in their location decisions.
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Figure 7 displays the coefficients and confidence intervals resulting from the estimation
of (3), again with and without cell/year and division controls. As we can see, the classification
code and grade level dummies are correlated with distance in the unconditional regression.
It is interesting to note, however, that the correlations seem inconsistent with the notion
that sophisticated criminals sort themselves away from the response station. In particular,
theft offences are less numerous in locations further away from the response station, relative
to violent offences.
Controlling for the cell/year indicators has the same two effects as in Figure 6. Firstly,
the confidence intervals narrow significantly as a result of the decrease in the residual vari-
ance of the dependent variable (the adjusted R-squared of the regression jumps from .35
to .98). Secondly, the estimated coefficients become essentially zero, despite the much nar-
rower confidence intervals. The F-statistic of a test of joint significance of the classification
code and grade level dummies also decreases dramatically from 12 to 1.6. We interpret the
evidence in Figure 7 as supporting the identification strategy in this paper.
5 Main Results
In this section we present and interpret the baseline results of the paper. We also evaluate
the robustness of these results.
Baseline Estimates Before displaying our baseline estimates, we show in Panel A of
Table 4 ’naive IV’ coefficients, based on regressions that use distance to the response station
as an instrument but do not control for the cell/year indicators. We label these estimates
naive based on our findings from Figures 6 and 7 and Table 3 that distance is unlikely to be
(unconditionally) orthogonal to the difficulty of clearing a crime. The reduced form estimate
in Column 1 suggests that crimes occurring 10% further away from the response station are
.48 percentage points less likely to be solved. In the second column we find the first stage
estimate. Reassuringly, the correlation between distance and response time that we first
identified in Figure 4 is robust to the inclusion of time, division and crime characteristics
indicators. The second stage coefficient is -.274, much larger than the OLS estimates.
We display the baseline results of the paper in Panel B of Table 4. Relative to the
naive IV specification, the reduced form estimate increases slightly, from -.048 to -.065,
when we introduce the cell/year controls. The first stage estimate is still very strong (the
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Kleibergen-Papp F statistic for weak identification is 53), and it suggests that a 10% increase
in distance to the response station is on average associated with a 1.4% increase in response
time. The second stage coefficient is -.469, approximately ten times larger than the OLS
estimate. The interpretation of the estimate is that a 10% increase in response time leads
to a 4.7 percentage points decrease in the clearance rate.
Robustness In Table 5, we present a number of tests designed to evaluate the robustness
of the baseline findings. Firstly, we introduce in Panel A response time and distance in
levels (minutes and kilometres, respectively). Our earlier choice of a logarithmic form was
motivated by the hypothesis that an extra minute in response time should have a bigger effect
when response time is relatively fast. The logarithmic relation was also meant to capture
the strongly concave relation between response time and the clearance rate plotted in Figure
4. Nevertheless, we find in Panel A qualitatively similar results when we introduce both
response time and distance in levels20. The second stage estimate is statistically significant
at the 1% level and indicates that, on average, an extra minute in response time leads on
average to a 1 percentage point decrease in the clearance rate.
In the baseline specifications we compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors (Conley, 1999). In Table 5 Panel B we display the p-values from the
wild bootstrap procedure of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008), clustering at the division
level. The coefficients are still significant at conventional levels21.
Next, we evaluate the extent to which our baseline estimates are disproportionately
based on extreme values of the response time distribution. The use of the logarithmic form
should minimise the impact of outliers, but the extreme positive skewness of the response
time distribution (see Table 1) suggests the need for a further robustness test. Therefore, in
Panel C we drop from the estimating sample observations at the top and bottom 5% of the
response time distribution. Our estimates are again quite similar.
Our last two robustness tests are perhaps best understood by looking again at Figure
5. Remember that our identification strategy exploits variation in distance controlling for a
large set of very small geographical cells. A large part of this variation is coming from cells
20The distribution of response time has a relatively large number of outlying observations, which have a
disproportionate effect on any regression in levels. Therefore, we decided to drop in this Panel observations
with a response time of more than 500 minutes (this is more than 8 times the target response time for Grade
2 calls) from this regression.
21The results are robust to clustering at the cell, division/year and division level (Appendix Table A17).
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that cross division boundaries, such as Cell 3. However, some variation in distance is also
due to locations that are slightly apart from each other but in the same cell and division,
such as the two locations in Cell 1. Arguably, this last type of variation is very small in
magnitude, given that the cells are very small. Nevertheless, we first test the robustness of
our baseline estimates to a specification that strictly uses only variation in distance across
locations occurring in ’boundary cells’. To do this, we restrict in Panel D the analysis to the
sub-sample of crimes in boundary cells (number of observations = 22,196). In Panel E, we
adopt a less radical strategy: we keep the baseline sample while weighting every observation
by (the log of) the inverse of the distance to a division boundary22. This procedure allows
us to keep all the observations, while deriving our estimates disproportionately from crimes
close to a boundary. Again, our estimates are very similar and we interpret this evidence as
reinforcing the main conclusion of the paper23.
Difference between the OLS and the IV estimates The 2SLS estimate is almost ten
times larger in size than the OLS estimate. One possible explanation for this difference is
obviously that the bias associated with the OLS estimate is positive. That would imply that
crimes benefiting from faster police response are those with a lower underlying likelihood of
being cleared. To understand why this relation may occur in practice, consider the likely
police response when receiving a call from a victim’s address. If the perpetrator of the
crime also lives in that address, her identity will be known to the victim and should be
eventually learned by the police, regardless of response time. If, however, the perpetrator is
a stranger to the victim, the police’s only chance may lie in responding rapidly in the hope of
22Strictly speaking, we weight using the log of the inverse of distance to a boundary plus 2. Adding 2
is necessary to make all the weights positive. The logarithmic transformation is necessary to preserve the
strength of the instrument. To see this last point, note Appendix Table A2, where we instead weight by
the inverse of distance to a boundary. Because a very small number of crimes take place within just a few
metres of the boundary, this weighting strategy leads to estimates that are strongly dependent on a very
small number of observations. We find in Panel A that both the reduced form and the second stage estimate
are very large in magnitude, although the Kleibergen-Papp F-statistic suggests that these estimates should
be taken with extreme caution. In Panel B, we again weight by the inverse of distance to a boundary, but
we drop all observations with distance to a boundary below 40 metres (approximately 1% of observations).
This leads to a strong instrument and to estimates very similar to our baseline estimates.
23In the Appendix we do an extra robustness test, motivated as follows. Given that our instrument is
supposed to induce exogenous variation in response time, the estimated coefficients should not be sensitive
to the inclusion or exclusion of other control variables. In Appendix Table A3, we examine whether this
is the case, respectively for the reduced form and second stage estimates. We introduce sequentially the
time indicators, the call handler’s grade level and the Home Office classification code. The estimates appear
remarkably robust to the set of controls in the regression. This is consistent with our finding in Figure 7
that distance is (conditionally) uncorrelated with these controls.
23
apprehending her as she flees the crime scene. Therefore, in the above example, the police will
optimally take less time for the crime in which the unconditional likelihood of apprehending
the criminal is lower, which will introduce a positive bias in the OLS estimation24.
An alternative reason for the large magnitude of the IV estimate is that the impact
of the instrument on the endogenous explanatory variable is not neutral with respect to the
heterogeneity of the effect across crimes. To understand this, consider Figure 8 Panel A,
where we posit a police decision-making process that is exclusively based on two character-
istics of calls. The first one is whether rapid response can prevent harm to the victim and
the second is whether rapid response can significantly increase the chances of clearing the
crime. In Figure 8 we further assume that distance to the crime scene is negligible, but
that the police pays a small cost if it responds very fast (for instance because this requires
preventing the responding officer from completing her current task). We posit that under
these circumstances the police would choose to respond fast unless rapid response has no
effect on either potential harm or the likelihood of a clearance (i.e. for the crime at the
bottom right corner).
Imagine now in Panel B that the distance between the response station and the crime
scene is higher, constraining how fast the response can be. Naturally, this constraint will
exclusively affect crimes where the unconstrained response was fast. Comparing Panel A
and Panel B in Figure 8, we can see that crimes where distance affects response time (the
’compliers’) are those characterised by a high effect of response time on the clearance rate,
relative to the average crime. In other words, under this very simple police decision-making
rule, the local average treatment effect should be higher than the average treatment effect.
Ideally we would want to validate this argument empirically. In practice we are unable
to perfectly do that, since we cannot identify the compliant crimes. However, Figure 8
provides some guidance in this respect. Note from the figure that the compliant crimes
are those for which (the unconstrained) response time is fast. Figure 8 therefore suggests
investigating empirically whether the instrument affects response times mostly at the lower
end of the response time distribution.
We do this in Figure 9. In Panel A we plot response time cdfs separately for low
(first quartile) and high (fourth quartile) values of distance. We find that the two cdfs start
24Needless to say, this stark example is provided as an illustration of a scenario that would lead to a
positive bias in the OLS estimates. We do not claim that this example represents an appropriate taxonomy
with which to categorise crimes.
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diverging very early: most of the vertical distance between the two curves is already evident
at response times of around 7 minutes. To confirm this, we plot in Panel B response time
pdfs, again separately for low and high values of distance. We use the pdfs to confirm that
the effect of an increase in distance is to decrease the probability of a very fast response
time (i.e. below 7 minutes) and increase the probability at almost every other point of the
response time distribution. Therefore, Figure 9 suggests that the main effect of an increase
in distance is to prevent the police from arriving very fast at those crime scenes that they
would like to reach as fast as possible. If, as Figure 8 hypothesises, these are precisely the
crimes with a higher than average effect of response time on the clearance rate, Figure 9
provides an explanation for the large magnitude of the 2SLS estimate25.
Evidence on Non-Response Patrolling Stations As we mentioned in Section 4, re-
sponse stations are also the base stations from which some neighbourhood teams operate.
This is a concern because it may be that it is the distance to the base station of a neighbour-
hood team (rather than the distance to the base station of a response team) that causes the
differential likelihood of clearance that we have identified above. The main reason why this
may happen is that, for the vast majority of crimes, neighbourhood officers are in charge
of following up on the preliminary investigations conducted by the response officers attend-
ing a crime scene. Perhaps these subsequent investigations are somehow conducted more
thoroughly when the crime scenes are closer to the neighbourhood team stations26.
To examine the plausibility of this alternative channel, we take advantage of the fact
that the divisions in the GMP contain a large number of police stations with a neighbourhood
team but without a response team. We can test the validity of the exclusion restriction
by examining whether distance to a neighbourhood (but non-response) station is similarly
correlated with the clearance rate. We create this new measure in exactly the same way as
25The analysis in Figure 9, while intuitive, is incomplete since our identification strategy uses distance
as an instrument conditionally on cell/year and other sets of fixed effects. In Appendix Figure A5, we
therefore plot the distribution of response time separately for high and low values of the residuals from a
regression of (log) distance on this baseline set of controls. The difference between the cdfs is difficult to
detect visually, but the pdfs confirm that the main effect of an increase in (the residuals of) distance is to
decrease the probability of response times below 7 minutes. In Appendix Table A4, we display quantile
regressions of log response time on log distance (Panel A) or its residuals (Panel B), at the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles. We find that response time at the 25th percentile increases with distance at a higher rate
than response time at the 75th percentile, which leads to a compression of the 75th-25th interquartile range
where distance is higher. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the notion that an increase in distance
disproportionately affects response times at the lower end of the response time distribution.
26However, note that when we suggested this possibility to several neighbourhood officers in the GMP,
the overwhelming response was that this was highly implausible.
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the distance to a response station described in Section 4, and display the results in Table 6.
We first find that the effect of distance to a non-response patrolling station on the
clearance rate is essentially zero. Note also that the standard errors are small, so the effect
is precisely estimated. In the second column we find that response time is uncorrelated
with distance to a non-response station, as we would expect. These findings suggest that
proximity to a response station increases the clearance rate by decreasing response time,
rather than by affecting the behaviour of the local neighbourhood team.
Effect on the Intensive Margin: Time to Clearance One way to interpret the ev-
idence above is that response times have an effect on the extensive margin of the police
production function, since faster response times can turn potentially non-cleared crimes into
cleared crimes. We now proceed to examine whether response times also have an effect on
the clearance intensive margin, in terms of reducing the time that it takes to clear crimes.
To do this, we restrict the sample to crimes that were cleared by August 2014, and use our
baseline empirical specification to study whether faster response times are associated with
faster clearance times.
The second column of Table 7 Panel A shows that the estimated relation between
response time and distance is very similar in the subsample of cleared crimes relative to that
in the overall sample (12% versus 14%). The smaller size of the sample leads, however, to
a much weaker instrument than in the baseline regressions of Table 4 Panel B (Kleibergen-
Papp F-statistic of 10.54). The estimated 2SLS elasticity in Column 3 is economically large:
a 10% increase in response time will lead to a 9.44% increase in the time that it takes to clear
a crime (in addition to the possibility that it may never be cleared at all). If ’justice delayed
is justice denied’, we can think of the extra time to clearance as an additional detrimental
effect of reaching a crime scene too late27.
6 Mechanisms
In Section 2 we discussed potential mechanisms through which fast response time could
make a difference. To reiterate, we mentioned that the police could arrest the offender
27In Table 7 Panel A, our analysis is based exclusively on crimes that were eventually cleared. Instead of
this, Appendix Table A9 displays the estimates from a duration analysis that includes all crimes and treats
crimes that were not cleared by the end of our sample period as censored. The findings are qualitatively
identical.
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either at the scene of the crime or in its vicinity; they could collect physical evidence before
it is contaminated or destroyed; they could interrogate witnesses before they have left the
scene and they could encourage victim or witness cooperation by signaling efficiency and
dedication. In this Section, we provide suggestive evidence in support of some of these
mechanisms.
Information on Suspects We first study the mechanisms of witness availability and
cooperation, specifically in terms of naming a suspect to the police. In our dataset, we have
information on whether a suspect was named, although unfortunately we do not observe who
named such a suspect or whether the suspect was confirmed as the person responsible for
the crime. It seems obvious, however, that the chances of clearing a crime should improve
strongly if the police receive such information. Isaacs (1967) and Chaiken et al. (1977), for
instance, find that a much larger percentage of cases are cleared if the police have a named
suspect. This is also the case in our dataset. Among crimes where there is a named suspect,
65% are cleared, whereas the clearance rate is only 29% in crimes without a named suspect.
To examine whether a suspect is named relatively more often when the police is faster in
attending the scene, we display in Table 7 Panel B the estimates from our baseline empirical
strategy where we substitute clearance by a dummy indicating whether a suspect was named
to the police. We find a strong effect: a 10% increase in response time is associated with
a 1.4 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of a suspect being named. This is an
economically significant magnitude, given that the mean of the suspect named dummy is
24%.
Additional indirect evidence regarding the importance of this mechanism comes from
differences in the effect of response time on the clearance rate across types of crimes. Victims
of violent crime know their assailants in a large proportion of cases, while the same is not
true for victims of theft (Uniform Crime Report, 2010). Therefore, rapid response is unlikely
to have a large effect on the likelihood that a suspect is named in a violent crime. For thefts,
however, reaching the crime scene quickly may be the only chance that the police has of
being pointed towards the likely perpetrator. If obtaining information on suspects is a major
channel through which response time matters, it should follow that the effect of response
time on the clearance rate is larger for thefts than for violent crimes.
In Table 8 Panel A, we split crimes into three categories (Violent, Theft and Other) and
interact the corresponding dummies with response time in equation (2) and with distance
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in equation (1)28. We find a much larger effect of response time on the clearance rate
for thefts, relative to violent crimes, which confirms our hypothesis above and provides
indirect evidence in support of the information on suspects mechanism. This larger effect is
particularly remarkable since the unconditional clearance rate is actually smaller for thefts
than for violent crimes.
In Table 8 Panel B, we repeat the exercise but substituting clearance by the suspect
named dummy. The estimates confirm our claim that response time affects the likelihood
of having a suspect named for theft crimes, but does not for violent crimes. Table 8 Panel
B also establishes that suspects are named to the police much more frequently in violent
crimes, most likely, as we argued earlier, due to victims knowing their assailants.
We interpret all the evidence above as suggesting that having a suspect named is a likely
important mechanism through which response time affects the clearance rate, especially for
thefts. Note, however, that the effect of response time on the clearance rate is still large
and statistically significant for violent crimes, even though information on suspects does not
appear to be an empirically important channel for such crimes. Next, we investigate an
additional potential mechanism.
Immediate Arrests We now examine whether response time is related to the likelihood
of making an arrest at the scene or in its vicinity. Unfortunately, our dataset does not record
the location where arrests take place. We can, however, observe their timing. We create
a dummy variable taking value 1 if an arrest takes place within 15 minutes of the police
reaching the crime scene. While this is an imperfect measure of ’on scene arrests’, we expect
that most immediate arrests occur either at the scene of the crime or as the perpetrator
attempts to escape. In principle, we expect all three crime types to be associated with this
mechanism: reaching the crime scene more quickly could allow the police to arrest both
violent criminals and non-violent shoplifters. Unsurprisingly, immediate arrests are strongly
correlated with the clearance rate. Among crimes with an immediate arrest, 85% were
cleared, while this percentage is only 34% for crimes without an immediate arrest.
In Table 7 Panel C, we replicate our baseline empirical strategy using immediate arrest
28Alternatively, we could run (1) and (2) separately for every type of crime. Due to the large number of
control indicators and to the fact that variation in distance to the response station is based on a relatively
small number of observations, this strategy leads to very weak instruments. We have therefore decided to
impose the assumption that the control variables do not have a differential effect by type of crime. Every
result in this section must be interpreted with this caveat in mind. Note also that, to preserve the strength
of the instruments, we have limited the number of crime categories to three.
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as the dependent variable. We find that a 10% increase in response time decreases the
likelihood of an immediate arrest by 2 percentage points, over a mean of 12%. We find in
Table 8 Panel C that, as expected, this relation holds for all three crime types, although it
is again stronger for thefts than for violent crimes. Nevertheless, the fact that, for violent
crimes, response time affects the likelihood of an immediate arrest while having no effect
on the likelihood of having a suspect named, suggests that, for violent crimes, catching the
offender at the scene may be the most important mechanism.
Needless to say, the evidence in this section does not represent conclusive proof that
immediate arrests (or, for that matter, information on suspects) are a channel through which
response time affects the clearance rate. It may be that every case with an immediate arrest
would have been solved eventually, even if the police had not made such an arrest. This
would be the case, for instance, if the victim knows her aggressor and additional necessary
evidence does not deteriorate over time. We interpret the evidence here as suggestive, but not
conclusive of the notion, that immediate arrests may be a channel through which response
time matters.
7 Cost-Benefit Analysis
We now perform a cost-benefit analysis of two hypothetical policies introduced in 2014 and
engineered to reduce average response times: (1) hiring one additional response officer, and
(2) moving the response stations to alternative, optimally chosen, locations. We concentrate
on the benefits arising from the crimes prevented when the clearance rate is higher, and
ignore other benefits such as those arising from restorative justice or ’cold glow’ effects
(Ouss and Peysakhovich, 2015). Catching more criminals prevents more crimes through two
main channels: it discourages potential criminals from offending (deterrence) and it prevents
offenders from re-offending (incapacitation). We consider these two channels separately
because incapacitation requires prosecuting and incarcerating criminals and is in this respect
an expensive tool, relative to deterrence. We devote the first two subsections to outline the
methodology and assumptions underlying the calculation of the effects. In the last two
subsections we use this methodology to compute the net benefits of the two posited policies.
Benefits and Costs from Incapacitation Assume a one percentage point increase in
the clearance rate in 2014. Given that 17,550 crimes occurred in 2014, this would have
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resulted in 175.5 additional cleared crimes. Appendix Table A10 calculates the additional
years of incarceration following this increase. We account for the fact that only a fraction of
cleared crimes lead to a criminal charge and that only a fraction of prosecuted crimes lead to
a conviction. Because the UK criminal justice system is relatively lenient, as compared to its
US counterpart, only a small fraction of convicted offenders are incarcerated and, conditional
on incarceration, average custodial sentences are relatively short. Lastly, we account for the
fact that the transitions between different stages of the criminal justice system vary greatly
across crime types. To illustrate, robberies comprise only a small proportion of GMP crimes
but lead to a high number of additional years of incarceration, while the opposite is true for
criminal damage crimes. In total, we calculate that this increase in the clearance rate would
lead to an extra 17.85 years of incarceration.
The benefit of an additional incarceration year depends on the effectiveness of incar-
ceration in decreasing crime and on the social cost of the crime prevented. Buonanno and
Raphael (2013) and Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014) provide the best estimates of the
number of crimes prevented per year of incarceration, and we use their middle point esti-
mate of 18 crimes29,30. Studies measuring the social cost of crime have used a wide variety
of methods (Donohue, 2009). We use the estimates from Home Office Report 30/05 because
they are UK-based and quite comprehensive, including costs in anticipation of crime (e.g.
protection and insurance), and costs resulting from the actual crime committed (e.g. harm,
lost output and criminal justice costs). The average cost per crime is £4, 189 (Appendix
29Buonanno and Raphael (2013) estimates are 13 and 18, depending on the specification. Barbarino
and Mastrobuoni (2014) baseline estimate is 23. These two papers use the same natural experiment in
Italy and generate estimates that are both highly credible and likely applicable to a UK context. Note
importantly that the estimates are inclusive of general equilibrium effects. Vollaard (2013) uses a similar
policy experiment from the Netherlands and estimates the number of crimes avoided to be 60. We do not
use this much higher estimate because, unlike in Italy, the Dutch experiment targeted prolific offenders. If
the crime-reducing effects of additional incarceration are subject to diminishing returns as less crime-prone
individuals are incapacitated (Vollaard 2013, Buonanno and Raphael 2013), the estimates from the Italian
experiment are more appropriate. We also do not use the lower estimates of Owens (2009) and Johnson
and Raphael (2012) for the very similar reason that they are generated from the US criminal justice system,
which is characterised by an incarceration rate of 666 per 100,000 (Institute for Criminal Policy Research,
2016). This is much higher than the 146 of England and Wales or the 91 of Italy, again prompting the
concern of diminishing returns. We do not use earlier evidence on incapacitation effects because it typically
suffers from weak research designs or insufficient statistical power and is also generated in a US context
(Marvell and Moody 1994, Levitt 1996).
30Note that we do not differentiate between the types of crimes being prevented, therefore implicitly
assuming that these are proportional to the prevalence of these types in the population of total crimes.
We would expect the population of incarcerated criminals to contain relatively serious offenders. To the
extent that criminals specialise in one type of crime, it should be the relatively more serious crimes that are
prevented by incapacitation.
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Table A11). This cost is well below most estimates in the literature so we view it as highly
conservative31.
Preventing crimes through incapacitation has costs, however. The cost per incarcer-
ation year is £33, 785 (UK Ministry of Justice, 2014). Appendix Table A12 calculates the
criminal justice costs from the prosecutions that result from increasing the clearance rate by
one percentage point, which we also base on the figures of Home Office Report 30/0532.
Benefits from Deterrence Most credible empirical research on deterrence has adopted
a reduced-form approach, linking crime to the number and visibility of police officers rather
than to the likelihood of being arrested and prosecuted (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). The
relatively few studies estimating the effect of clearance rates use panels of states or cities,
and often suffer from measurement error and endogeneity biases. The most influential study
is probably Levitt (1998), who finds elasticities between -.1 and -.3 for five crime categories
and interprets these as mostly reflecting deterrence, rather than incapacitation33.
In Appendix Table A13 we provide an estimate of the deterrence benefit of increasing
the clearance rate by one percentage point. Due to the lack of precise and credible estimates
in the deterrence literature, we are highly conservative in our assumptions. Firstly, we
assume an elasticity of -.1, which is at the very lowest end of the range of values typically
estimated. Secondly, we assume that this non-zero elasticity only applies to robberies, thefts
and violent crimes, therefore assuming no deterrence at all on a quarter of Manchester crimes
including some serious crimes such as sexual assaults. Thirdly, we measure the social cost
of crime again using the Home Office Report 30/05, a conservative estimate. Overall, we
estimate a benefit of £138,240 resulting from this assumed increase in the clearance rate.
31For example, our cost is much lower than influential estimates such as Cohen et al. (2004), McCollister
et al. (2010) and Cohen and Piquero (2009), and slightly below the estimates in Barbarino and Mastrobuoni
(2014).
32There are other costs that, while potentially important, are difficult to quantify. For instance, we do not
account for the incarcerated individual’s wasted human capital, the potentially increased criminal capital,
the decline in wages following her release and the pain and suffering of inmates and their families. For a
discussion of the difficulty in measuring these, see Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014).
33The categories are aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft. The standard errors
are very large for homicide and rape, due to insufficient statistical power (see Table 3 in Levitt 1998). Other
recent studies include Mustard (2003, elasticities ranging from -.1 to -.3), Kelaher et al. (2016, elasticities
ranging from -.25 for property crimes to -.33 for violent crimes), and Curry et al. (2016, elasticities from
-.2 to -.4 for violent crimes and from -.5 to -.6 for property crimes.). Again, these elasticities are typically
interpreted as mostly reflecting deterrence. We account for the fact that they may also partly capture
incapacitation effects by being highly conservative in the elasticity that we use in our computations.
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Hypothetical Policy 1: Hiring One Additional Response Officer We now evaluate
the hypothetical policy of hiring one additional response officer in 2014. The annual total
cost of the officer is £45,745, including salary, training, benefits and pension contributions34.
Obtaining a causal estimate of how this additional officer will affect response times is not
straightforward. A plausible estimate can be obtained by exploiting variation in the number
of response officers that are unavailable due to sickness, under the assumption that variation
in this measure is idiosyncratic conditionally on the baseline set of controls35. In Appendix
Table A14 we regress response time on the number of sick police officers, using different
parametric specifications. The most conservative estimate suggests that an increase by one
unit in the number of response officers available reduces response time by .22%.
Putting together the above figure with the baseline estimate from Table 4, we predict
an increase in the clearance rate of .001045 percentage points36. Using the methodologies
in Appendix Tables A10-A13, we can then compute the predicted additional years of incar-
ceration and the benefits and costs through the incapacitation and deterrence channels. In
Table 9 Panel A we add these costs and benefits to calculate the interim benefit of the policy
(£77,851). We find that hiring an additional officer would generate a benefit equivalent to
170% of her payroll cost.
Needless to say, the finding that the net benefit of this policy is positive and large
is a direct result of this paper’s baseline result that reducing response times leads to a
large increase in the clearance rate. In addition, two elements are important. Firstly the
fact that, according to the best available estimates, incapacitation effects are substantial
34This annual cost is calculated on the basis of the estimate of £47,000 provided in 2017 to us by the
GMP. Compensating the officer and incarcerating criminals would in principle require raising taxes. We do
not account for the resulting tax distortions in our calculations.
35The sickness data was provided by the GMP Human Resources department and it captures the dates in
which officers were officially sick, regardless of whether they were on duty on that particular date. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have information on the rotas of the response teams. A potential concern arises if officers
strategically report sick only on days when they are on duty. If that is the case, a regression of response time
on the number of sick officers will overestimate the effect of hiring an additional officer. This is because this
additional officer would only work a 40-hour week, which includes duty and non-duty days. An additional
related concern is that the disruption to a response team may be particularly high if an officer calls in sick
shortly before the shift is about to start. In practice, the number of days lost to very short sickness spells
(three days or less) is very small, making strategic or last-minute reporting a minor concern. An additional
concern is that officers that typically fall sick may be of lower quality, in which case their absence may not
have a representative effect on response time.
36An assumption here that we make for simplicity is that response time increases the clearance rate equally
for all crime types. Appendix Table A10 shows that incarceration for thefts and robberies account for a very
large proportion of the total incarcerated years. Allowing response time to affect clearance rates differently
using the estimates from Table 8 would increase the theft and robbery incarcerated years and therefore the
incapacitation effects.
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(and incarceration levels well below optimal)37. Secondly, we have relied on the finding in
Appendix Table A14 that response times in Manchester appear to be highly constrained by
the availability of personnel38.
Hypothetical Policy 2: Relocation of Response Stations We now evaluate the al-
ternative policy of reducing the distance between the average crime and the closest response
station. To the extent that the location of response stations in 2014 was not optimal, re-
locating to new premises could substantially reduce response times and increase clearance
rates. We assume that suitable buildings could be found in the alternative optimal locations,
and calculate the maximum relocation costs that would make such moves worthwhile.
Any optimality procedure must account for the fact that divisions often contain more
than one response station, so the optimal location decisions require identifying from what
station each crime will be responded. We use the clustering algorithm K-means, which
finds geographic concentrations in a point database and determines the center points. After
identifying a cluster partition, the process continues iteratively until all points are associated
with the closest mean center. We set the number of clusters in each division equal to the
number of response stations in 2014.
Appendix Table A15 displays the results of this procedure, separately for each division.
As expected, the average distance is always lower when we relocate response stations to
their optimal locations. We use the baseline estimates from Table 4, together with the
methodologies in Appendix Tables A10-A13, to calculate the predicted increase in clearance
rates and the benefits through the deterrence and incapacitation channels. Because a station
relocation costs a lot upfront but yields benefits over a long horizon, we compute the overall
benefits over the following ten years39. We then calculate the relocation cost per station that
37On the other hand, given the uncertainty in the literature we have avoided assuming large deterrence
effects. Because deterrence effects are probably larger than we have assumed, the net benefit in Table 9 can
best be interpreted as a lower bound estimate.
38The importance of this constraint has been repeatedly expressed in public by GMP officials (Storey
2014, Scapens 2016), and is consistent with the large reductions in the number of police officers following
the budgetary cuts that started in 2010.
39This aggregation requires two important assumptions. Firstly, that the average locations where crimes
occur are unchanged over time, making the new locations optimal throughout the ten year period. Implicit in
this assumption is the notion that criminals do not observe the station relocations, understand the importance
of response times, and adjust the location of their crimes accordingly. This notion is consistent with the
evidence in Table 3 and Figure 7 on the absence of discontinuities in crime rates and types around division
boundaries. However, it may still be that the presence of a nearby response station is easily observed and
responded to at least by criminals operating in its close vicinity. The second assumption is of a zero discount
rate. This is for simplicity, and the calculations can be easily adjusted to account for a positive discount.
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would allow this policy to break even over ten years. Appendix Table A15 orders the divisions
from higher to lower break-even cost, and shows that there is substantial heterogeneity
in the cost effectiveness of the policy. In the South division, for instance, relocating the
three response stations would reduce the average distance by 44%, so the policy would be
worthwhile even if each relocation costs almost a million pounds. In Bury, on the other hand,
the existing response stations are almost optimally placed, making the cost-effectiveness of
this policy much lower40.
In Table 9 Panel B we compute the benefits of relocating all the response stations in
Manchester. We find that this policy would be cost effective as long as, on average, it costs
less than £369,814 to relocate a response station.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided robust evidence of a causal effect of police response time on
crime clearance rates. The estimated effects are large and strongly significant. They hold
on the extensive margin (clearance rate) as well as on the intensive margin (time to clear-
ance, conditional on eventual clearance). We find stronger effects for thefts than for violent
offenses, although the effects are large for every type of crime. Lastly, we have provided
some evidence on two of the mechanisms through which police response time operates: the
likelihood that a victim or witness will name a suspect to the police, and the likelihood of
making an ’on scene’ arrest.
Our findings contradict long-standing beliefs among criminologists regarding the ef-
fectiveness of rapid response policing. While the existing consensus is that rapid response
policing has either a zero or at best a very weak effect on the clearance rate, we argue
that minimising response time is a highly effective policy in terms of apprehending a larger
We note, however, that during this period interest rates in the UK were close to zero.
40It is difficult to obtain precise information on the likely cost of relocating a police station. A particular
complicating factor is that often response teams share the premises with other police units, such as neigh-
bourhood or investigative teams. As a result, the buildings where they are based have areas larger than the
minimum areas required to house only a response team. In Appendix Table A16, we provide information
on all the GMP ex-police station buildings that were sold at auction between 2007 and 2017. Together with
the sale price, we have information on the building area and on whether that building was the base of a
response team at some point in the past. Buildings that housed a response team are clearly bigger and
more expensive. Even under the most conservative assumptions Appendix Table A16 reveals, however, that
the relocation policy would be cost effective for at least some divisions. For instance, assuming a relocation
cost equal to a 10% of the building’s value and using as a reference point the most expensive building in
Appendix Table A16 (Bootle Street, £2.5 million), the relocation policy would be worth pursuing for five of
the eleven GMP divisions.
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percentage of criminals. This is clearly critical for societies interested in providing general
deterrence or in incapacitating criminals that are unlikely to be deterred.
Needless to say, we do not claim that financial resources should be allocated to this
particular policy and in detriment to every other policy that could help combat crime.
Nevertheless, we have identified two policies that under reasonable assumptions would be
more than cost effective from a societal perspective.
Lastly, as Sherman (1997) indicates, one reason for the failure to question the above
consensus with new work is that field experiments on response policing are both expensive
and ethically challenging. This paper illustrates the potential for using natural variation in
policing inputs to study the effectiveness of policing practices, in settings where experimental
variation is unfeasible.
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FIGURE 8: HYPOTHETICAL RESPONSE TIMES, BY CRIME TYPE
ILLUSTRATING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LATE AND ATE
This figure displays an example of hypothetical response times, by crime type and by distance to the
response station. We divide crimes into four types, depending on: (a) whether rapid response has a
significant effect on preventing harm to person or property, and (b) whether rapid response has a
significant effect on the likelihood of a clearance. In Panel A, we assume that distance is low and therefore
that response time is unconstrained. As a result, we hypothesise that response time will be fast unless
rapid response has no effect on either potential harm or the likelihood of a clearance. In Panel B, we
assume that distance is high, which constrains response time to being slow for all crimes. The three crime
types in the left and top of the tables represent, in a LATE framework, the set of compliant crimes. The
crime type in the bottom right is the ’never taker’ crime.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Panel A: All Crimes
Mean Median SD Min Max
Cleared .38 0 .48 0 1
Time to Clearance (days) 34.47 4 113.44 0 2218
Immediate Arrest .12 0 .32 0 1
Suspect Named .24 0 .43 0 1
Response Time (min.) 73.3 16.82 315.01 .07 21613.58
Distance to Station (km.) 3.25 2.26 3.68 0 19
Grade 1 .31 0 .46 0 1
Grade 2 .69 1 .46 0 1
Violent Crimes .24 0 .43 0 1
Theft Crimes .53 1 .5 0 1
Other Crimes .23 0 .42 0 1
Panel B: Crimes in Boundary Cells
Mean Median SD Min Max
Cleared .33 0 .47 0 1
Time to Clearance (days) 45.32 5 143.1 0 1676
Immediate Arrest .1 0 .3 0 1
Suspect Named .21 0 .41 0 1
Response Time (min.) 76.9 18.85 334.47 .08 20051
Distance to Station (km.) 7.25 4.27 6.28 .01 18.99
Grade 1 .3 0 .46 0 1
Grade 2 .7 1 .46 0 1
Violent Crimes .23 0 .42 0 1
Theft Crimes .57 1 .49 0 1
Other Crimes .2 0 .4 0 1
Panel A reports summary statistics for all crimes in the baseline sample (N=306606), while Panel
B is based on the subsample of crimes occurring within cells encompassing more than one division,
i.e. ’Boundary Cells’ (N=22196). ’Cleared’=1 if the crime was cleared. ’Time to Clearance’ is the
difference between the clearance date and the crime date (it is computed only for cleared crimes).
’Immediate Arrest’=1 if the police made an arrest within 15 minutes of reaching the crime scene.
’Suspect Named’=1 if a suspect was reported to the police by a victim or witness to the crime.
’Response Time’ is the number of minutes between the creation of the incident by the handler taking
the call and the arrival of the response officer to the scene of the crime. ’Distance to the Station’ is
the geodesic number of kilometres between the scene of the crime and the closest response station.
’Grade 1’=1 if the incident was allocated a target response time of less than 15 minutes. ’Grade 2’
is defined respectively for 60 minutes. ’Violent Crimes’=1 if the Home Office-classified crime type
is either Violent Offenses, Sexual Offenses or Robbery. ’Theft Crimes’=1 if the crime type is Theft.
’Other Crimes’=1 if the crime type is Criminal Damage/Arson, Public Order Offenses, Possession
of Weapon or Miscellaneous.
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TABLE 2: OLS ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cleared Cleared Cleared Cleared Cleared
Log Response -.053*** -.057*** -.05*** -.048*** -.049***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Hour/Day/Month/Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade No No Yes Yes Yes
Home Office Code No No No Yes Yes
Division No No No No Yes
R2 .39 .03 .01 .01 .01
This Table displays linear probability models of the clearance rate on response time. The number of observations
is 306606. Columns (2)-(5) control for Hour of Day fixed effects, Day of Week fixed effects, Month fixed effects and
Year fixed effects. Columns (3)-(5) control for whether the call was regarded as a Priority Response (Grade 2; target
response < 60 min.) or as an Emergency Response (Grade 1; target response < 15 min.). Columns (4)-(5) include
fixed effects for the type of crime, following the UK Home Office classification code. Crime types include Violent
Offenses, Sexual Offenses, Robbery, Theft Offenses, Criminal Damage/Arson, Public Order Offenses, Possession of
Weapon and Miscellaneous. Column (5) controls for the 11 territorial divisions (North, South, Salford, Tameside,
Stockport, Bolton, Wigan, Trafford, Bury, Rochdale, Oldham). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
spatial standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999). The cross-sectional units are the cells (cutoff = 10km.) and
the time units are the years (two lags).
TABLE 3: BALANCING TEST 2
Log Number of Crimes on Log Distance
(1) (2)
VARIABLES LogCrimes LogCrimes
Log Distance -0.075** -0.010
(0.032) (0.009)
R-squared 0.004 0.609
Cell X Year F.E. No Yes
Division F.E. No Yes
N 57731 57731
An observation is a UK census output area and year combination.
Standard Errors in Parentheses Clustered by Division X Year.
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TABLE 4: 2SLS ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3)
MODEL Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
DEP. VARIABLE Cleared Log Response Cleared
Panel A: Naive
Log Distance -.048*** .174***
(.006) (.011)
Log Response Time -.274***
(.034)
Cell X Year F.E. No No No
Kleibergen-Papp F 228.63
Panel B: Baseline
Log Distance -.065*** .139***
(.01) (.02)
Log Response Time -.469***
(.072)
Cell X Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Papp F 53.13
This table displays 2SLS regressions of the clearance rate on response time, using distance to the response
station as an instrument for response time. Columns (1), (2) and (3) display the reduced form, first stage
and second stage estimates, respectively. All regressions include Hour of Day, Day of Week, Month, Grade,
Home Office code and Division fixed effects. Panel A also includes Year fixed effects. Panel B includes Cell
X Year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent spatial standard errors in parentheses
(Conley, 1999). The cross-sectional units are the cells (cutoff = 10km.) and the time units are the years
(two lags).
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TABLE 5: ROBUSTNESS
(1) (2) (3)
MODEL Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
DEP. VARIABLE Cleared (Log) Response Cleared
Panel A: Variables in Levels
Distance (km.) -.018*** 1.711***
(.006) (.519)
Response (min.) -.011***
(.003)
Observations 298208 298208 298208
Panel B: Wild Bootstrapped Division-Clustered S.E.
Log Distance -.065*** .139***
[.00] [.00]
Log Response -.469***
[.04]
Observations 306606 306606 306606
Panel C: Dropping 10% Outliers
Log Distance -.065*** .11***
(.01) (.015)
Log Response -.592***
(.094)
Observations 273659 273659 273659
Panel D: Boundary Cells Sub-Sample
Log Distance -.077*** .176***
(.017) (.039)
Log Response -.44***
(.098)
Observations 22196 22196 22196
Panel E: Weighting by Distance to the Border
Log Distance -.069*** .138***
(.009) (.018)
Log Response -.499***
(.09)
Observations 306606 306606 306606
This table displays robustness tests to the baseline findings in Table 4 (Panel B). Columns (1), (2) and (3) display the
reduced form, first stage and second stage estimates, respectively. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the log of
response time, unless otherwise noted. All regressions include the baseline set of Hour of Day, Day of Week, Month, Cell X
Year, Grade, Home Office code and Division fixed effects. Standard errors are HAC spatial (Conley, 1999) unless otherwise
noted. The regressions in each panel deviate from the baseline regressions in the following way. In Panel A, Distance and
Response Time are in levels, instead of logs (the dependent variable in Column (2) is also in levels). In Panel A we reduce
the impact of outliers by dropping observations with a response time above 500 minutes. In Panel B, the standard errors
are clustered at the Division level (number of clusters = 11). Estimated p-values based on the wild bootstrap of Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) are provided in square brackets instead of standard errors. In Panel C, 5% of observations have
been dropped at each tail of the response time distribution. In Panel D, the analysis is restricted to the sub-sample of
crimes occuring in boundary cells (i.e. cells encompassing more than one division). In Panel E, we weight every observation
by (the log of) the inverse of the distance to a division border.
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TABLE 6: EVIDENCE ON
NON-RESPONSE POLICE STATIONS
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Cleared Log Response
Log Distance (Non-Response) .002 .012
(.007) (.027)
This table displays OLS regressions of Cleared and Log Response Time on distance to po-
lice stations that are the base of a neighbourhood team but not of a response team. The
regressions are identical to those of Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 Panel B, except for
the independent variable of interest. All regressions include Hour of Day, Day of Week,
Month, Cell X Year, Grade, Home Office Code and Division fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent spatial standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999). The
cross-sectional units are the cells (cutoff = 10km.) and the time units are the years (two
lags).
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TABLE 7: OTHER LEFT HAND SIDE VARIABLES
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
MODEL Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
DEP. VARIABLE Log Time Log Response Log Time
Log Distance .113*** .12***
(.047) (.029)
Log Response .944***
(.393)
Mean Time to Clearance 34.47
Kleibergen-Papp F 10.54
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
MODEL Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
DEP. VARIABLE Suspect Named Log Response Suspect Named
Log Distance -.02** .139***
(.009) (.02)
Log Response -.141**
(.066)
Mean Suspect Named .24
Kleibergen-Papp F 53.13
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
MODEL Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
DEP. VARIABLE Immediate Log Response Immediate
Arrest Arrest
Log Distance -.029*** .139***
(.006) (.02)
Log Response -.208***
(.04)
Mean Immediate Arrest .12
Kleibergen-Papp F 53.13
This table displays 2SLS regressions equivalent to the ones in Table 4 (Panel B) but with different dependent variables.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) display the reduced form, first stage and second stage estimates, respectively. All regressions
include the baseline set of Hour of Day, Day of Week, Month, Cell X Year, Grade, Home Office code and Division fixed
effects. In Panel A, the dependent variable is (log of) the number of days that it took the police to clear the crime,
conditional on eventual clearance. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if a suspect was named to
the police by a victim or witness to the crime. In Panel C, the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the police
made an arrest within 15 minutes of reaching the crime scene. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent spatial
standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999). The cross-sectional units are the cells (cutoff = 10km.) and the time units
are the years (two lags).
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TABLE 8: HETEROGENEITY OF IV ESTIMATES
Panel A: Cleared (1) Violent (2) Theft (3) Other
-.24*** -.681*** -.35***
(.078) (.085) (.061)
P-value 6= (1) 0 .028
P-value 6= (2) 0
Mean Cleared .47 .3 .44
Panel B: Suspect Named (1) Violent (2) Theft (3) Other
.035 -.322*** -.011
(.078) (.068) (.055)
P-value 6= (1) 0 .256
P-value 6= (2) 0
Mean Suspect Named .46 .13 .26
Panel C: Imm. Arrest (1) Violent (2) Theft (3) Other
-.13*** -.261*** -.202***
(.052) (.041) (.04)
P-value 6= (1) .001 .036
P-value 6= (2) .034
Mean Immediate Arrest .16 .08 .16
Every Panel displays the estimated coefficients from a single regression. In every regression the popu-
lation of crimes has been divided into three crime types. The displayed coefficients are for the effect of
response time on the Panel dependent variable for the type described in the column. In every regression
the instruments are the interaction of distance with the crime type dummies. In Panel A, the dependent
variable is Cleared. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if a suspect was
named to the police by a victim or witness to the crime. In Panel C, the dependent variable is a dummy
taking value 1 if the police made an arrest within 15 minutes of reaching the crime scene. All regressions
control for Cells X Year, Hour of Day, Day of Week, Month, Division, Grade and Home Office Code fixed
effects. None of the control variables are interacted with the group dummies. Heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation consistent spatial standard errors in parentheses (Conley, 1999). The cross-sectional units
are the cells (cutoff = 10km.) and the time units are the years (two lags). The means for the response
time variable for Violent Crimes, Thefts and Other Crimes are 69.94, 75.63 and 71.46, respectively. The
Kleibergen-Papp F-statistic is 18.29.
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TABLE 9: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Panel A: Hiring one additional police officer
Incarceration Cost -£62,840
Criminal Justice System Costs -£14,391
Benefits through Crimes Prevented (Incapacitation) £140,636
Benefits through Crimes Prevented (Deterrence) £14,443
Interim Benefit £77,851
Payroll Cost -£45,745
Ratio 170%
Panel B: Relocation of all police stations
Incarceration Cost -£7,200,072
Criminal Justice System Costs -£1,644,355
Benefits through Crimes Prevented (Incapacitation) £16,069,256
Benefits through Crimes Prevented (Deterrence) £1,650,697
Break-Even Cost per Station £369,814
This table displays the costs and benefits of hiring one additional police officer (Panel A) and relocating
all the police stations to alternative, optimally chosen, locations (Panel B). Both policies are hypoth-
esised to be implemented in 2014. In both panels we present separately the benefits in terms of the
crimes prevented through the incapacitation and deterrence channels. Because incapacitation requires
incarceration and criminal justice system costs, these are also presented separately. In Panel A, we cal-
culate the interim benefit (costs and benefits through the incapacitation and deterrence channels) and
the ratio between the interim benefit and payroll cost of the additional officer. In Panel B, all costs and
benefits are aggregated over ten years under the assumption of no discount rates. In the bottom row,
we present the maximum cost per station that would make the policy cost effective. It is calculated as
the interim benefit (costs and benefits through the incapacitation and deterrence channels) divided by
24 (the number of response stations in 2014).
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